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1 Introduction
It is commonly understood that several e¤ects of immigration in receiving
countries depend crucially on immigrants characteristics.1 At the same
time, the relation between immigration policy and immigrants skill compo-
sition remains largely unexplored. In the economics literature as in policy
debates, the demand and supply sides of immigration tend to be considered
separately.2
As a rst step towards lling this gap, we develop a simple model in which
both immigration policy and immigrants skill composition are determined
in equilibrium. Whether an individual with a given skill decides to migrate
depends on the immigration policy implemented and at the same time that
policy depends on whether high or low skilled individuals are more likely
to migrate. We are interested in exploring how the optimal immigration
policy changes once it is taken into account that any such policy a¤ects
immigrants skill composition.
It is important to look at both the supply and demand sides in a unied
framework because of a well known fact. Migrants are not a random sample
of their home country population. Incentives to migrate and resources to
pay the migration costs vary with skills. Given immigrants self-selection,
any immigration policy a¤ects not only the size but also the skill compo-
sition of the migration ow. Since self-selection determines how di¤erent
potential migrants respond to a policy change, understanding what drives
such selection becomes crucial for optimal policy design.
We develop this argument in a setting with two countries. In the sending
country, individuals, called foreigners, are endowed with di¤erent skills and
wealth, and depending on their endowment they decide whether to work at
home or migrate to the receiving country. In the receiving country, indi-
viduals, called natives, support an immigration policy that maximizes their
equilibrium wages. In particular, high skilled natives aim at increasing the
supply of low skilled immigrants, while low skilled natives push for increas-
ing the supply of high skilled immigrants. According to these preferences
and to the weight attached to di¤erent groups in the population, i.e. low vs.
high skilled and immigrants vs. natives, the receiving country government
sets the immigration restrictions.
In our main analysis, we focus on immigration restrictions which a¤ect
the cost migrants have to pay to enter and work in the receiving country,
such as direct fees or bureaucratic requirements that increase the time and
money needed to comply. These restrictions are assumed to be the same
1Conning attention to the economics literature, see Borjas (1994), Friedberg and Hunt
(1995), Chiswick, Lee and Miller (2005) on the labor market e¤ects, and Storesletten
(2000), Lee and Miller (2000), Chojnicki, Docquier and Ragot (2011) on the e¤ects on
public nance.
2Some notable exceptions are mentioned below.
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for all immigrants. This allows us to emphasize that even in this case the
policy a¤ect immigrants in di¤erent ways, thereby determining their self-
selection.3 In fact, on the one hand, the restrictions imply that only the
richest foreigners can migrate, and these tend to be the high skilled. On the
other, the restrictions induce only those with the most to gain to migrate.
If returns to skills are higher in the sending country, these migrants tend to
be the low skilled. Hence, depending on whether immigration is driven by
incentives or wealth constraints, and on whether returns to skills are higher
in the sending or in the destination country, restrictions may improve or
worsen immigrants skill composition.
We then decompose the e¤ect of immigration policy in the receiving
country as an e¤ect on the size and an e¤ect on the composition of the
migration ow. We show that these e¤ects typically work in opposing di-
rections: the size e¤ect, whereby the number of immigrants is varied, while
keeping their skill composition xed, hits hardest those foreigners with a
higher propensity to migrate; conversely, the composition e¤ect tends to be
stronger on those who migrate less. Moreover, the composition e¤ect may
dominate the size e¤ect, especially at lower levels of restrictions: those for-
eigners with the lowest propensity to migrate may be, in absolute terms, the
most sensitive to a policy change. Hence, the composition e¤ect may reverse
the immigration policy outcomes as predicted by the size e¤ect alone.
We illustrate some implications of this result by considering the optimal
policy design by a utilitarian government maximizing natives total income.
In this setting, if immigrants skill composition was exogenous, the govern-
ment would not restrict immigration. Open immigration would maximize
the benets arising from skill complementarities between natives and im-
migrants. However, the fact that restrictions inuence immigrants skills
implies that even this utilitarian government may optimally implement pos-
itive immigration restrictions. The reason is that restrictions help in induc-
ing the optimal skill mix of immigrants. This observation may provide a
rationale for positive immigration restrictions even absent any redistribu-
tive concerns or political economy distortions. As we show, what is needed
is that immigrants receive a lower weight than natives in the governments
welfare function.
We also sketch some implications of our results for the political economy
of immigration, and in particular for the determination of natives prefer-
ences concerning immigration policy. The composition e¤ect implies that
such preferences may not be fully dened in terms of current immigrants
skill composition. For example, some natives may support a more restrictive
policy even though current immigrants are not detrimental to them, since
3Moreover, as we discuss in Section 4, this framework appears useful for analyzing
other policy instruments, like quotas, as well as the possibility for the receiving country
to impose di¤erent immigration restrictions on di¤erent types of migrants.
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tighter restrictions would change immigrants skill composition in their fa-
vor.
The present paper builds on two broad streams of literature. On the
supply side of migration, we model the migration decision as a basic human
capital investment (Sjaastad, 1962), in which self-selection may be driven
both by cross-country returns to skills (as in Borjas, 1987) and by wealth
constraints (as in Lopez and Schi¤, 1998, Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005, and
Friebel and Guriev, 2006). Unlike most of this literature, the emphasis is in
how immigration policies may a¤ect immigrants self-selection.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the determination of immigra-
tion policies.4 Apart for stressing the interaction with the supply side, our
approach is novel in that we consider migration cost as the policy variable.5
This variable seems important as any restriction to immigration entails, at
least indirectly, monetary costs. Moreover, the exercise appears useful even
if one considers our policy variable literally as a tax on immigrants. Such
a tax has recently received attention in policy debates (see Freeman, 2006
and Legrain, 2007), but its e¤ects have received little attention in formal
models.6
As stressed, the interaction between demand and supply appears under-
emphasized in this literature. Two notable exceptions are Bellettini and
Ceroni (2007) and Giordani and Ruta (2008). While similar in spirit, both
their modeling approaches and their results are di¤erent. Bellettini and
Ceroni (2007) assume that immigrants are positively self-selected and argue
in favor of a high immigration quota: by reducing wages in the receiv-
ing country, this would increase immigrant quality and maximize national
income. Giordani and Ruta (2008) focus instead on how immigration prej-
udices can be self-fullling: restrictive policies tend to attract low skilled
immigrants and these immigrants are a drain on welfare in the receiving
country, which in turn sustains anti-immigration attitudes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model; Section 3 derives the main results. In Section 4, we discuss the ro-
bustness of our results to alternative assumptions and propose some avenues
for extensions. Section 5 concludes by suggesting some policy implications.
Omitted proofs are provided in the Appendix.
4See for example Benhabib (1996), who explores how the median voter determines
minimal capital requirements for admission and Epstein and Nitzan (2006) and Facchini
and Willman (2005), who use a lobbying model to explain the formation of immigration
quotas.
5See Myers and Papageorgiou (2002) for a comparison of di¤erent immigration policies
when the sending and receiving countries have homogeneous populations.
6From an historical viewpoint, it is also interesting to notice that the rst interventions
to limit and select immigration ows in the U.S. and Canada acted on costs rather than
on quantities (see Timmer and Williamson, 1998 for a detailed account).
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2 The model
Consider a world with two countries, a sending and a receiving country. We
are interested in the interaction between workers in the sending country,
who may decide to migrate, and the receiving countrys government, which
sets the immigration policy.
2.1 The sending country
The sending country is populated by a continuum n of workers, called
foreigners. Foreigners are heterogeneous in three respects: skill, migration
cost, and initial wealth. Let n denote the mass of foreigners with skill ,
where  2 fH;Lg:7 A foreigner i with skill  may migrate to the receiving
country and earn the endogenous wage w, or he can work in the sending
country for an exogenous wage w :
8
If he migrates, each foreigner has to incur a monetary cost . This cost
has to be paid up-front, and no borrowing is possible, so migration may
be limited by wealth constraints. Specically, foreigners are endowed with
some wealth, drawn by a distribution 
 with continuous density !:When
 is interpreted as an observable skill (like education), it is assumed that
the high skilled tend to be wealthier than the low skilled (see Filmer and
Pritchett, 1999; and Piketty, 2000).9 Formally, this writes
!L
1  
L

!H
1  
H
; (1)
for every  2 R+:10 In addition, the migration cost includes an individual-
specic psychological cost "i; which may reect individual characteristics like
age, family ties, access to networks in the origin and destination country.11
7A recent literature emphasizes that the acquisition of skills in the sending country
may be a¤ected by immigration policy (e.g. Mountford, 1997; Stark, Helmenstein and
Prskawetz, 1997; Vidal, 1998; Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2001), and that would pro-
vide an additional reason to consider the e¤ect of immigration policy on immigrants skills.
We here take the sending country skill composition as exogenous in order to emphasize
that immigration policy induces a composition e¤ect (described in Section 3.3) even for a
given pool of foreigners.
8While wages in origin countries may be a¤ected by emigration (see Hanson, 2005 and
Mishra, 2007), we focus here on the e¤ects in the receiving country.
9We notice in Section 3.3.1 how this framework can be applied to selection on unob-
servable characteristics.
10Equation (1) assumes conditional stochastic dominance, which is slightly stronger than
rst order stochastic dominance and weaker than the standard assumption of monotone
likelihood ratio (see Krishna, 2002).
11 In our formulation, these elements are not systematically correlated with the skill :
One may instead assume that the low-skilled have higher migration costs, since for example
they can hardly give up the support of their community in terms of access to credit (as
in Banerjee and Newman, 1998 and Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2009) or unemployment
insurance (as in Cuecuecha, 2005). This would be qualitatively similar to our framework,
in which wealth constraints are more likely to be binding for the low-skilled.
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Specically, "i is assumed to be a random variable following a log-concave
cumulative distribution  with continuous density .12 This assumption
implies that the ratio


is decreasing. (2)
2.2 The receiving country
The receiving country is populated by a continuum n of workers, here called
natives, who are heterogeneous in skill  2 fH;Lg:13 Natives are assumed
to have a linear utility function which depends only on equilibrium wages
w:
14 These wages are determined in a competitive labor market as
w =
@F (NH ; NL)
@N
; (3)
where F (NH ; NL) is the receiving country production function and N is
the sum of natives and immigrants with skill 
N = n + x: (4)
We focus on purely redistributive e¤ects of immigration, whereby immi-
grants compete with similarly skilled natives and complement natives with
di¤erent skills. In particular, we simply let the production technology be a
constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas function
F (NH ; NL) = N

HN
1 
L ; (5)
where  2 (0; 1): The receiving country government is interested in regulat-
ing the inows of immigrants as these inuence natives utility. Its goal is
to maximize the welfare function
W = HwH + LwL; (6)
where  denotes the weight attached to group s utility. We will mostly
consider a utilitarian function with  = n:
15 Immigration policy acts on ;
which is the cost foreigners have to incur to enter and work in the receiving
country. This policy is common to all immigrants. As mentioned in the
Introduction, and further discussed in Section 4.1, we want to emphasize
that even such a policy a¤ects their self-selection. Hence, we write the
governments program as
max
2R+
HwH() + LwL(): (7)
12Log-concavity is satised by basically all "named" distribution functions (see Bagnoli
and Bergstrom, 2005).
13While one may model the interaction between immigration policy and human capital
formation in the receiving country, we wish here to make our point in the simplest setting
and so take the receiving country skill distribution as given.
14We discuss more general formulations in Section 4.3.
15Some extensions and possible ways to endogenize these weights are discussed in Section
4.2.
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3 Analysis
We now show that, in order to set the optimal policy, the receiving country
government has to predict the e¤ects of such policy on immigrants skill
composition. This in turn requires an understanding of the forces driving
the decision to migrate.
3.1 The migration decision
A foreigner i with skill  prefers to migrate if w   ( + "i)  w ; so for
each skill  there exists a cut-o¤ value "  w   w    such that any
individual with skill  and a cost "i lower than " would like to migrate. In
addition, this individual must be su¢ciently wealthy to pay the migration
cost : Thus, the supply of migrants with skill  is dened by
x = qn

; (8)
where q is the fraction of foreigners with skill  who can a¤ord and who
are willing to move, i.e.
q = [1  
()][w   w

   ]: (9)
We dene immigrants skill composition as the ratio of high to low skilled
migrants, i.e.
Q =
qH
qL
; (10)
and we say that immigrants are positively self-selected if and only if Q  1:
3.2 Optimal immigration restrictions
According to equations (3) and (5), equilibrium wages in the receiving coun-
try can be written as
wH = R
 1; (11)
and
wL = (1  )R
; (12)
where R is the ratio of high to low skilled workers
R =
NH
NL
=
nH + xH
nL + xL
: (13)
Hence, the receiving country skill distribution and equilibrium wages depend
on migration ows, and then on the immigration policy .16 We can write
16Notice that wH is uniquely dened by equations (11) since the right hand side of
(11) is continuous and decreasing in wH : Hence, the xed point problem always has a
unique solution. Similarly, wL and R are uniquely dened by equations (12) and (13),
respectively.
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the governments program in equation (7) as
max
2R+
HR
 1 + L(1  )R
: (14)
The low skilled benet from a high R, i.e. a large inow of high skilled
immigrants, and the high skilled benet from the opposite. Given these
preferences, the optimal policy depends on the weights . The higher H ,
the lower the R induced by such a policy.17
For now, we ignore redistributive concerns or other political economy
distortions, and consider a purely utilitarian setting in which each group is
valued by its size. In this setting, no immigration restrictions are imposed
if immigrants are given the same weight as natives. In fact, if
 = N; (15)
then the welfare function W in (6) does not depend on R; i.e. on high vs.
low skilled wages, but only on total production. Hence, W is maximized by
setting  = 0.
A preference for high or for low skilled workers instead arises when immi-
grants receive a lower weight than natives. In this case, the government sets
its policy so as to benet the group of workers with the lowest proportion
of immigrants. Suppose the government cares only about natives, then
 = n; (16)
and we have that
dW
d
= (1  )wH [
nLxH   nHxL
nH + xH
]
dR
d
: (17)
In this case, the welfare function W is convex in R and it has a minimum at
R = nH=nL: E¢ciency gains from immigration are minimized when immi-
grants have the same skill composition as the native population, i.e. when
xH=xL = nH=nL. Since the government maximizes e¢ciency, i.e. natives
total income, it aims at optimizing the skill ratio R.
As a benchmark for our following analysis, suppose that immigrants skill
composition was exogenous. In that case, setting the immigration policy and
achieving the optimal skill ratio would be easy. We would have
dW
d
 0;
17This logic can be applied also if one introduces capitalists into our model. Assuming
that immigrants bring no capital, returns to capital in the receiving country depend on
the complementarily or substitutability between capital and skilled/unskilled labor. If
both skilled and unskilled labor are complementary to capital, capitalists would push for
open immigration and so the optimal  would decrease with the weights associated with
capitalists utility. If instead skilled (unskilled) labor is assumed to substitute for capital,
capitalists interests would be aligned with those of skilled (unskilled) workers.
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and so imposing no immigration restriction would be optimal. We can show
this in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 If immigrants skill composition is taken as given, a utili-
tarian government imposes no immigration restrictions.
However, as is clear from (9), immigrants skill composition does depend
on the immigration policy. Hence, solving the governments program in
equation (17) requires an understanding of the forces driving the migration
ows, which is the issue we now address.
3.2.1 Size and composition e¤ects
In what follows, we provide an intuitive discussion of how R depends on
the immigration policy ; a more formal derivation can be found in the
Appendix (Section 6.2). By totally di¤erentiating R in (13), one can show
that
dR
d
 0 if and only if
@xH
@
NL 
@xL
@
NH ; (18)
where @x=@ are partial derivatives (describing the direct e¤ect of immigra-
tion policy on immigration ows). The relation in (18) can be decomposed
in the product of two forces. If the composition of immigrants were inde-
pendent of , that is dQ=d = 0; then
dR
d
 0 if and only if
xH
xL

nH
nL
: (19)
If instead xH=xL = nH=nL; then
dR
d
 0 if and only if
@Q
@
 0: (20)
Equation (19) describes a size e¤ect, i.e. what happens to the skill ratio R
when one varies the number of immigrants, while keeping their skill com-
position xed. According to equation (19), increasing the cost increases the
ratio R if and only if immigrants are less skilled than natives. As shown in
Proposition 1, open immigration would maximize total welfare if immigra-
tion restrictions had only a size e¤ect. However, as described by equation
(20), any immigration policy also changes the average skill of immigrants.
This represents a composition e¤ect : higher restrictions increase the skill
ratio R if and only if they increase immigrants skill composition Q. Before
turning to the rest of our analysis, in which we investigate what drives such
a composition e¤ect and what its implications are for optimal policy design,
we state the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 Immigration policy a¤ects the receiving countrys skill ratio
by changing the size and the composition of the migration ow, as described
respectively by equations (19) and (20).
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3.3 The composition e¤ect
Standard discussions about immigration policies ignore the composition ef-
fect. However, such disregard may be misleading: this e¤ect may reverse
the predictions based on the size e¤ect alone. In fact, as we now show, there
are situations in which the tension between the two e¤ects is inescapable,
since immigrants skill composition Q increases in  if and only if immigrants
are more skilled than natives. In addition, the composition e¤ect may be
stronger than the size e¤ect.
Self-selection is less likely to be an issue if the skill compositions of the
two countries are very di¤erent. If for example the sending country has a
very poor skill composition, all else being equal, a more restrictive policy is
likely to have a larger impact on low skilled foreigners, thereby increasing
the ratio R. This e¤ect being clear, we now concentrate on selection issues
and so consider the case in which the skill composition between the sending
and the receiving country is similar.18 In particular, we let
nH = nH and n

L = nL: (21)
The relation between R and  then depends on how the policy a¤ects the
propensity of low and high skilled foreigners to migrate, i.e. on the elas-
ticities of qH and qL with respect to . Predicting such a relation requires
an understanding of the forces behind immigrants self-selection, as we now
consider.
3.3.1 The simplest case: no wealth constraints
To illustrate our argument in the cleanest way, we rst ignore wealth con-
straints. Besides being simple, this way of modeling the migration decision
emphasizes cross-country wage di¤erentials, as in the classic self-selection
literature. Moreover, this may be the most natural setting if one is in-
terested in selection along non-observable dimensions, which need not be
systematically correlated with wealth.
In this case, immigrants self-selection is driven only by the incentives
that foreigners face according to their skills, and immigrants skill composi-
tion in equation (10) can be written simply as
Q =
(wH   w

H   )
(wL   wL   )
: (22)
Therefore, immigrants are positively self-selected if and only if absolute gains
from migration increase with skills, i.e. if (wH   wH)  (wL   w

L):
19 This
18Notice that even in this case, given heterogeneous migration costs "i, wages would not
be equalized across countries and some foreigners may still prefer to migrate.
19 In their empirical analysis, Grogger and Hanson (2008) emphasize the role of absolute
vs. relative wage di¤erentials in explaining self-selection patters.
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condition can be rearranged in terms of wage di¤erentials in the sending vs.
receiving country as
w  w; (23)
where w = wH   w

L and w = wH   wL: Accordingly, when condition
(23) holds, we say that returns to skills are higher in the receiving country.
Wage di¤erentials also drive the relation between Q and immigration
restrictions. In fact, simply di¤erentiating (22), we have
@Q
@
 0() ("L)("H)  ("H)("L)  0() w  w: (24)
Equation (24) describes an incentive e¤ect. From equation (2), changing
costs has a relatively higher impact on the foreigners with lower gains from
migration. When wage dispersion is higher in the receiving country, these
foreigners tend to be low skilled. Hence, further restrictions improve immi-
grants skill composition if and only if w  w; that is if immigrants are
more skilled than natives. This implies a tension between size and composi-
tion e¤ects. The reason for this is intuitive: the size e¤ect by denition hits
a group of foreigners proportionally to their propensity to migrate, while
the composition e¤ect tends to be stronger on the least represented group.
To see the e¤ects on the receiving country, we notice that the composition
e¤ect can be stronger than the size e¤ect. A marginal increase in the cost
may decrease (increase) R despite immigrants being less (more) skilled than
natives. As we show in the Appendix, this is the case if the ratio =(1 +)
is decreasing, which in turn is more likely to happen when  is low. As
a result, the relation between the skill ratio and immigration restrictions
may be non-monotone. We summarize these observations in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 3 When immigrants self-selection is determined by incentives
alone,
a) Immigrants are positively self-selected if and only if w  w;
b) Immigration restrictions increase Q if and only if w  w;
c) Under condition (21), size and composition e¤ects work in opposing di-
rections;
d) The relation between R and  may be non-monotone, with the composi-
tion e¤ect being stronger for low levels of .
The fact that the composition e¤ect may reverse the policy outcome as
predicted by the size e¤ect alone, has a number of surprising implications.
First, in this setting, even a utilitarian government may impose positive
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immigration restrictions. In fact, as discussed after equation (17), a gov-
ernment with weights  = n aims at optimizing the skill ratio. If the
relation between R and  is non-monotone, however, this requires setting a
positive : Restrictions here are not due to distributional concerns, or other
departures from pure e¢ciency, but they are a way to screen immigrants by
a¤ecting their self-selection. We can then state the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 Immigration restrictions may be optimal even for a utilitarian
government that cares only about natives total income.
A second implication of the composition e¤ect is that some natives may
support further immigration restrictions even if immigrants are not detri-
mental to them. Suppose for example that immigrants are positively self-
selected and they improve the receiving countrys skill ratio. In this case,
low skilled natives may push for a higher  even if immigration increases
their wage, since restrictions would further improve immigrants skill com-
position, the receiving countrys skill ratio and so low skilled wages. Hence,
individual preferences over immigration policy should consider immigrants
self-selection in addition to their skill composition. We summarize this in
the following Corollary.
Corollary 2 When the composition e¤ect prevails, some natives may sup-
port further restrictions even if immigrants are not detrimental to them.
3.3.2 The general case: incentive and wealth e¤ects
We now explore how the previous insights carry through in a setting where
potential migrants face wealth constraints, which may also drive self-selection.
For our purposes, this implies that it may not be su¢cient to know whether
immigrants are positively or negatively self-selected, but one needs to know
also what drives self-selection. Those with the highest gain from migration,
and then the highest willingness to pay for it, are not necessarily the ones
with the greatest resources to pay for it.
Besides being a more general formulation of the migration decision, this
setting matches better with the empirical evidence on self-selection in terms
of observables. As implied by equation (1), wealth constraints are less severe
for the high skilled, which pushes towards positive self-selection. As a result,
immigrants may be positively self-selected even if returns to skills are higher
in the source country and physical costs of migration are relatively small.20
In this setting, we rst notice that increasing immigration restrictions
improves immigrant skill composition Q when
("L)("H)  ("H)("L)
("H)("L)
+
!L(1  
H)  !H(1  
L)
(1  
H)(1  
L)
 0: (25)
20See for example the study of Mexican immigrants to the U.S. by Chiquiar and Hanson
(2005).
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The rst term is the same incentive e¤ect described in the previous Section.
The second term represents a wealth e¤ect. By equation (1), this is always
positive: by increasing the cost, one gets richer and more skilled immigrants.
In this setting, size and composition e¤ects have opposite directions
whenever the relation between Q and  is monotone, i.e. either w  w
or self-selection is driven only by wealth constraints or only by incentives
(the reason being the same as in the previous analysis). As shown in the
Appendix, in such cases, the composition e¤ect prevails when the foreign-
ers with the lowest propensity to migrate are, in absolute terms, the most
sensitive to a policy change. In turn, this is more likely to be the case when
the cost is su¢ciently small; hence, as in the previous analysis, the relation
between R and  need not be monotone. We state this more formally in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 4 When immigrants self-selection is determined both by in-
centives and by wealth constraints,
a) Immigrants are positively self-selected if w  w or wealth constraints
dominate;
b) Immigration restrictions increase Q if w  w or the wealth e¤ect
dominates;
c) Size and composition e¤ects may work in opposing directions;
d) The relation between R and  may be non-monotone, with the composi-
tion e¤ect being stronger for low levels of restrictions;
e) Corollaries 1 and 2 still hold.
4 Discussion and extensions
In this Section, we discuss the role of our main assumptions in the above
analysis and propose some extensions of our framework.
4.1 Immigration policy
Taken literally, our model makes some important simplications about immi-
gration policy. We assume that restrictions a¤ect the migration cost alone,
and that they act unconditionally on skills. We now discuss how our insights
would be a¤ected by changing these assumptions.
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4.1.1 Alternative policy instruments
First, immigration restrictions include several dimensions beside the mon-
etary cost : Along these lines, one may view our framework as a starting
point from which to complicate the policy space. For example, immigration
is typically restricted via quotas. In our setting, however, changing the quota
a¤ects immigrants self-selection in a similar way as changing the cost . In
fact, the quota a¤ects the probability that, upon submitting an application,
a foreigner receives an entry visa. Suppose that making such an application
entails a cost (either monetary or in terms of time). A foreigner applies for
a visa only if the expected benets, i.e. the wage di¤erential multiplied by
the probability of getting the visa, exceeds the cost. Changing the quota
then has a stronger impact on those with lower gains from migration, which
is the same incentive e¤ect we described in the above analysis. Unlike in our
analysis, the way in which di¤erent quotas interact with wealth constraints
is less clear.
In addition, immigration typically requires compliance with a signicant
amount of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy too may a¤ect self-selection: it re-
quires time, whose value may di¤er according to skills, or money (e.g. for
paying for the assistance of specic private agencies). As a simple example,
assume that each migrant has to invest some xed amount of time  in bu-
reaucracy, and this time is worth w : Since in this case bureaucracy is more
harmful for the high skilled, the conditions for positive self-selection become
harder to satisfy. When only incentives matter, positive self-selection re-
quires that w > (1 + )w; i.e. returns to skill in the receiving country
are su¢ciently high to compensate also for the greater waste of time. With
respect to the case of no bureaucracy, then, an increase in restrictions (i.e.
both  and ) is more likely to reduce immigrants skill composition.
There are several other ways in which the immigration policy space can
be enriched. Nonetheless, the general theme stressed throughout this paper
appears robust to the particular modeling choice. In order to predict the
e¤ects of immigration policy, one needs to account for the (indirect) e¤ect on
immigrants skill composition, as determined by immigrants self-selection.
4.1.2 Skill-dependent policy
Turning to the second issue, receiving countries may indeed try to impose
di¤erent restrictions on di¤erent types of immigrants. Even under this lens,
however, there are several reasons which make the above analysis of some
value. First, and perhaps most importantly, this analysis emphasizes that
even policies independent of immigrants skills have a screening power. This
is important as, in all receiving countries, many signicant aspects of immi-
gration policy tend to be independent of skills. For example, these countries
regulate the total number of immigrants, the amount of bureaucracy needed
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to get a visa, the way immigrants are treated once in the country (say in
terms of access to welfare), and so on. Policy discussions around these issues
tend to neglect the indirect e¤ect on the composition of immigrants, and this
paper makes precise a sense in which such omission may be misleading.
Second, systems which directly screen immigrants according to their
skills may be very complicated to implement and not necessarily very ef-
fective. Indeed, in countries where such systems are in place, like Australia
and Canada, they do not appear to e¤ectively inuence immigrants skills
and long-term success in the receiving country (as argued e.g. in Miller,
1999 on Australia; in Antecol, Cobb-Clark and Trejo, 2003 and Jasso and
Rosenzweig, 2008 on Canada and Australia). In other words, direct selec-
tion of immigrants appears to be a di¢cult task since not all the desirable
characteristics can be precisely described and veried. Moreover, the assim-
ilation of immigrants depends also on unobservable dimensions, which are
by denition not contractible and as such they can be a¤ected only through
indirect screening mechanisms.
Last, our analysis would be of use even if one took the extreme view
that the receiving country can perfectly well implement a policy conditional
on immigrant skill, and so impose di¤erent costs on low and on high skilled
immigrants. In such an ideal world, our analysis would show the policy
dimension along which the skill ratio R is most sensitive. Suppose for exam-
ple that the government wishes to increase R: This could be done either by
increasing the cost for low skilled immigrants L or by decreasing the cost
for high skilled immigrants H : The government may be interested in which
is the most e¢cient way to go, i.e. in whether a larger e¤ect on R would be
induced by changing L or H . This would require computing
dR
dH
=

NL
2  
@xH
@wH
@wH
@R
NL +
@xL
@wL
@wL
@R
NH
 1 @xH
@H
NL;
and
dR
dL
=  

NL
2  
@xH
@wH
@wH
@R
NL +
@xL
@wL
@wL
@R
NH
 1 @xL
@L
NH :
From these relations, we see that dRdH
 
 dRdH
() @xH@HNL 
@xL
@L
NH : (26)
Condition (26) is equivalent to condition (18), from where our analysis
started.21 In other words, even in this setting, determining the optimal
policy may require accounting for the same size and composition e¤ects
emphasized above.
21To see the equivalence, notice that xH does not depend directly on L so @xH=@H
in equation (26) equals @xH=@ in equation (18). Similarly for xL:
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4.2 Governments preferences
We focused on the case of a utilitarian government which values each group
according to its size. We view the weights  = n as a useful starting
point as they allow us to identify how the composition e¤ect changes the
optimal policy program. Distributional concerns and political economy con-
siderations may provide additional reasons to impose restrictions. Instead,
as shown in Proposition 1, in a setting with  = n any immigration re-
striction is driven by the composition e¤ect.
There are however many ways in which our framework can be extended.
First, while considering a linear utility function simplies our analysis, one
may introduce a more general form for natives utility. Each group would
then receive a weight which depends on  and on the groups marginal util-
ity, and this would induce a greater concern for the low skilled (who have
higher marginal utility). Second, one could model the process of aggregating
natives preferences in a more structured (and perhaps more realistic) way.
For example, one could think of a majoritarian democracy where only the
largest group of natives gets positive weight. If these are low skilled, the
government would aim at maximizing the skill ratio R. Alternatively, one
could introduce lobbying activities whereby each group may bid for protec-
tion and try to increase its weight in the governments program. In this case,
the government may trade o¤ contributions and social welfare, and aim at
some intermediate R. More generally, one could add to our model a stage
in which the weights  are determined. These weights then determine the
optimal R and the ensuing optimal immigration cost. In the above analy-
sis, we have taken the weights as given and described how the government
would set its policy in order to move towards the optimal skill ratio R. In
this sense, the insights developed on size vs. composition e¤ects are robust
to the specic way in which the weights  are determined.
A di¤erent line of extension would be to include in the government ob-
jective function the direct costs and benets of implementing a given immi-
gration policy. In our main analysis, we have not considered the potential
revenues associated with immigration costs (as instead emphasized by pro-
ponents of entry taxes, see the references in the Introduction). As detailed
in Section 4.1, our policy  need not be interpreted as an entry tax: a signif-
icant share of migration costs depends on immigration restrictions without
being pocketed by the receiving country government (e.g. immigrants ex-
penses for legal and consulting services needed to comply with bureaucracy).
At the same time, we have not considered any cost of implementing the im-
migration policy (as instead stressed e.g. in Beine, Docquier and Özden,
2009). In order to emphasize these costs and benets, the government ob-
jective function in (6) can be rewritten as
W = HwH() + LwL() + T ()  C();
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where T () = (xH()+xL()) are the revenues and C() are the costs asso-
ciated with implementing the policy . Denote  the cost which maximizes
labor market benets HwH() + LwL() we have considered so far, and
 the cost which maximizes net revenues T () C() (assuming the prob-
lem has a unique solution).22 The government would then typically choose a
cost between  and : That is, in this world, the government would have
to balance the e¤ects of the implementation of immigration policy on scal
balances with its e¤ects on natives wages. Still, in order to estimate the
latter, it would have to take into account the composition e¤ect we stressed
in our main analysis.23
4.3 Natives preferences
In the above analysis, natives skills determine preferences over immigra-
tion policy through standard labor market competition between immigrants
and natives. Labor market interactions have received the greatest attention
in the economics literature on the e¤ects of immigration in receiving coun-
tries (see e.g. Borjas, 1994 and Bauer and Zimmermann, 2002 for surveys).
Nonetheless, the evidence is certainly controversial. Some studies nd a
rather small e¤ect on natives wages (Friedberg and Hunt, 1995 and Card,
2005), while others (e.g. Borjas, 2003) report that immigrants compete with
similarly skilled natives and signicantly lower their equilibrium wages (see
also Ottaviano and Peri, 2008 for a recent review of these estimates). The
same labor market e¤ect has also been proposed as an explanation of na-
tives attitudes towards immigration policy (see Scheve and Slaughter, 2001
and Mayda, 2006). In countries where immigrants are less skilled than na-
tives, more educated individuals tend to support more liberal immigration
policies, and this correlation disappears once one considers people outside
the labor force.
More generally, our focus on the e¤ects on R may be useful to analyze
several other issues which we have left aside. For example, natives pref-
erences on immigration may be driven also by public nance and political
economy issues. From a scal viewpoint, one may argue that high skilled im-
migrants are always preferred since they pay higher taxes and receive fewer
welfare benets. Hence, high skilled natives would trade-o¤ the reduction
in wages with the scal benet of accepting high skilled immigrants.24 On
political economy issues, if immigrants gain political power in the receiving
22Of course, the optimal  need not be equal to the one derived in a setting with no
taxes, as these may change the returns to skills in the receiving country.
23 I acknowledge useful suggestions by one of the referees in shaping this discussion.
24Suppose that the government collects tw and distributes the revenues with a lump
sum transfer to every worker. Now high skilled utility is a convex combination with
weight t of the wage wH ; which depends negatively on R; and the transfers, which depend
positively on R. The e¤ects of these concerns on individual preferences over immigration
are documented in Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2007) and Facchini and Mayda (2009).
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country, then natives may trade-o¤ the e¤ect on their wages with the e¤ect
on the political equilibrium (as in Ortega, 2005). Depending on these trade-
o¤s, natives would determine their preferred skill ratio R and push for any
policy which moves towards such R. But again, our results on how R varies
with  do not depend on the specic way in which such a preferred R is
determined.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a simple framework for analyzing the in-
teraction between immigrants self-selection and the determination of im-
migration policy. We have shown that any immigration policy a¤ects the
composition of the migration ow and have explored some implications of
this e¤ect for optimal policy design. We have carried out our analysis in a
setting intended to be the simplest for conveying our insights on the com-
position e¤ect. This clearly leaves many avenues open to future research,
some of which have been mentioned in Sections 2 and 4. Another interesting
extension would be to consider a dynamic model in which current migra-
tion ows depend also on past ows, through migration networks or family
reunication. In such a model, current immigration policy a¤ects future
migration ows and so the optimal policy design should also consider the
relation between the characteristics of initial and subsequent immigrants.25
We wish to conclude by suggesting some possible policy implications of
our results. As mentioned in the Introduction, the e¤ects of immigration
largely depend on immigrants composition, and as such receiving countries
may have a great interest in improving their ability to screen. In this re-
spect, our results show that, given immigrants self-selection, any policy has
some indirect screening power. Given that size and composition e¤ects tend
to work in opposing directions, this may signicantly complicate the optimal
policy design. On the other hand, such screening power may be viewed as an
additional dimension to exploit. Since the e¤ectiveness of direct screening
mechanisms appears limited, immigration policies may consider inuencing
self-selection ex-ante rather than imposing restrictions ex-post. As we have
shown, this in turn requires understanding the forces shaping the decision to
migrate. By a¤ecting the way di¤erent potential migrants respond to policy
changes, immigrants self-selection is then key also for receiving countries.
Nothing is terribly surprising in this statement. There is a large and funda-
mental literature studying how di¤erent types of agents respond di¤erently
to changes in prices.26 For some reason, the literature on immigration policy
25See e.g. Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath (1996), Beine, Docquier and Özden
(2009), McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) for theoretical and empirical contributions on the
role of past immigration in shaping the size and composition of current migration ows.
26These agents being borrowers dealing with interest rates, workers with wages or poli-
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has generally overlooked this issue, and, from this perspective, this paper
may be a step towards lling the gap.
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6 Omitted Proofs
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
If the composition of immigrants is independent of ; it must be that
@
@
xH
xL
= 0;
that is
@xH
@
xL =
@xL
@
xH : (27)
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Hence, by (27),
@R
@
=
@xH
@
(nL + xL) 
@xL
@
(nH + xH)
(nL + xL)2
=
@xH
@
nL  
@xL
@
nH
(nL + xL)2
;
and so again by (27), recalling that @x=@ < 0;
@R
@
 0() nHxL   nLxH  0:
Hence, by equation (17), dW=d has the same sign as (nLxH nHxL)(nHxL 
nLxH); which is negative. That is, W decreases in  and so open immigra-
tion is optimal when the composition of immigrants is independent of .
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Totally di¤erentiating equation (13) and rearranging terms, we have that
dR
d

NL
2  
@xH
@wH
@wH
@R
NL +
@xL
@wL
@wL
@R
NH

=
@xH
@
NL  
@xL
@
NH :
Since @wH=@R < 0 and @wL=@R > 0; the term in parentheses is positive,
so
dR
d
 0 if and only if
@xH
@
NL 
@xL
@
NH ;
which is equation (18) in the main text. Multiplying both sides of equation
(18) by xLxH ; we see that the ratio R increases in  if and only if
xH
nH + xH

@xH
@
xL 
xL
nL + xL

@xL
@
xH : (28)
Equation (28) can be decomposed into a size and a composition e¤ect, as
described respectively by equations (19) and (20) in the main text.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3
When immigrants self-selection is determined by incentives alone, immi-
grants skill composition in equation (10) can be written simply as
Q =
(wH   w

H   )
(wL   wL   )
:
Hence,
Q  1, wH   w

H  wL   w

L;
that is point (a) in the Proposition. As mentioned in the text, point (b)
follows by simply di¤erentiating (22) and using assumption (2). Turning to
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point (c), notice that substituting (21) into equation (19), we can write the
size e¤ect as
dR
d
 0, qH  qL;
while by assumption (2) the composition e¤ect in (20) writes as
dR
d
 0 , qH  qL:
Hence under (21) size and composition e¤ects work in opposing directions.
To see point (d), rewrite condition (18) as
@qH
@
nHnL  
@qL
@
nLnH +
@qH
@
qLn

Hn

L  
@qL
@
qHn

Ln

H  0; (29)
which under (21) writes as
@qH
@
 
@qL
@
+
@qH
@
qL  
@qL
@
qH  0: (30)
Hence, if the ratio =(1 + ) is decreasing, that is
@qH
@
 
@qL
@
+
@qH
@
qL  
@qL
@
qH  0, qH  qL;
then the composition e¤ect dominates. Further restrictions increase R if and
only if they improve Q, which in our case requires w  w. The ratio
=(1 + ) is decreasing if for example the psychological cost of migration
"i is uniformly distributed over some interval [a; b]: Hence, for " 2 [a; b];
("L) = ("H) and, substituting into equation (30), we see that
@R
@
 0() ("H) ("L)  0() w  w: (31)
From equation (31), restrictions increase the skill ratio R if and only if
immigrants are more skilled than natives. Hence, as long as both thresholds
"L and "H lie within the interval [a; b]; the composition e¤ect prevails. When
instead one of the thresholds "L and "H lies outside the interval [a; b], the
sign of the derivative is reversed, i.e. the size e¤ect prevails. This also shows
the possibly non-monotone e¤ect of  on R. If the cost becomes so high that
no high skilled foreigner has any incentive to move, the composition e¤ect
disappears. Such cost is implicitly dened by
 = wH()  w

H   a;
where  always exists since wH is bounded so  > wH   wH   a for 
su¢ciently large. Hence, in this example, the composition e¤ect is stronger
for   ; while the size e¤ect dominates afterwards. As a result, the relation
between R and  is U-shaped, with a minimum at  = .
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6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The logic follows the proof of Proposition 3 by noticing that now selection
is driven both by incentives and wealth constraints, where the latter always
push towards positive self-selection due to assumption (1). Hence, as stated
in (a), if w  w then immigrants are positively self-selected because
both of incentive and wealth e¤ects. (If instead w < w; the e¤ect
is ambiguous. As  ! 0; incentives dominate so the relation tends to be
negative. As  increases, the shape of Q depends on the strength of the
two e¤ects: when ("H) goes to zero faster than (1  
L), Q tends to zero
as  increases; when the opposite occurs, there exists a cost beyond which
the wealth e¤ect takes over, so the relation is U-shaped.) If w  w
or the wealth constraint dominates, then the relation between Q and  is
monotone, and the analysis in Proposition 3 goes through (points b and c).
In this case, given equation (21), a su¢cient condition for the composition
e¤ect to prevail is that, as mentioned in the text, the foreigners with the
lowest propensity to migrate are, in absolute terms, the most sensitive to a
policy change, that is
xH  xL if and only if
@qH
@

@qL
@
: (32)
In fact, condition (25) holds if and only if xH  xL; that is,
@qH
@
qL 
@qL
@
qH , xH  xL: (33)
Together with condition (32), (33) implies condition (30), that is R increases
with  despite immigrants being more skilled than natives. That is, the
composition e¤ect prevails (point d). Similarly to the previous analysis, the
composition e¤ect may prevail only when the cost is su¢ciently small, so
that the population of migrants who respond to policy changes is su¢ciently
heterogeneous. If the cost is so high that only one group of foreigners mi-
grates, being the richest or the most motivated, then by denition there is
no composition e¤ect. Given this possible non-monotonicity in the e¤ect of
 on R, the discussion after Proposition 3 still holds and so Corollaries 1
and 2 follow.
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